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In the absence of government commitment, the conduct of ﬁscal and monetary policy de-
pends on the sign of inherited net nominal government obligations. When these obligations are
negative, monetary policy is non-distortionary and ﬁscal policy distortions are smoothed over
time, either forever or for a ﬁnite number of periods, depending on the initial state. For pos-
itive net nominal government obligations, both ﬁscal and monetary policies are distortionary,
and there exists a unique and stable steady state. At this steady state, a reform endowing the
government with a commitment technology has no eﬀect on policy. For any level of initial debt,
the estimated welfare loss due to lack of government commitment is small.
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11 Introduction
Monetary policy and government debt are inextricably linked. First, the level of debt aﬀects
monetary policy decisions, since inﬂation can be used to reduce the real value of inherited nominal
debt. Second, monetary policy aﬀects ﬁscal policy decisions, since it determines how current deﬁcits
are going to be ﬁnanced tomorrow, i.e., how future distortions are internalized today. Both these
channels are theoretically and empirically relevant.1
Following the tradition of Kiyotaki and Wright (1989, 1991, 1993), Lagos and Wright (2005)
propose a tractable framework for the study of monetary policy, with explicit micro foundations for
the role of ﬁat money.2 The literature spawned by Lagos and Wright (2005) has revisited classic
questions in monetary economics3, but so far—with the exception of Aruoba and Chugh (2008)—
has restricted attention to exogenous, stationary (i.e., constant) government policy. Two questions
arise naturally. First, is the Lagos-Wright framework with the addition of endogenous government
policy suitable for positive analysis, i.e., are its predictions compatible with observations on actual
economies? Second, what are the model’s implications for the determinants of policy and the design
of institutions?
To answer these questions, I consider a variant of Lagos and Wright (2005), with the addition
of a benevolent government that cannot commit to future policy choices and uses money, nominal
bonds and (distortionary) taxes to ﬁnance the provision of a valued public good. As shown in
Martin (2009), government lack of commitment links monetary policy and debt as described above,
and provides a mechanism that explains the level of debt.4
How the level of debt aﬀects monetary policy depends on the sign of inherited net nominal
government obligations (i.e., money plus bonds). When net obligations are positive, there is an
incentive to inﬂate above the Friedman rule to reduce the ﬁnancial burden; these incentives increase
with the debt-money ratio. Conversely, when net obligations are negative, the incentives go in the
opposite direction and monetary policy is thus, non-distortionary, i.e., the marginal values of money
and bonds are equalized.5 Hence, monetary policy exhibits a “kink” at zero nominal obligations.
If nominal claims on the private sector (i.e., negative net government obligations) are suﬃ-
ciently large, then the government perfectly smoothes distortions across periods, which determines
a continuum of steady states, including the ﬁrst-best. For this range of nominal claims, the govern-
ment behaves as in Barro (1979). If the inherited claims are positive but insuﬃcient to implement
perfect distortion-smoothing, then distortions are smoothed for only a ﬁnite number of periods by
rolling-oﬀ debt. Due to the “kink“ in monetary policy described above, policy in this range features
1Ohanian (1998) provides a thorough historical account for the U.S. economy. Sargent and Wallace (1981) ﬁrst
showed how the eﬀects of monetary policy are aﬀected by a given ﬁscal policy. See Martin (2009) for a related
discussion.
2Shi (1997) provides an alternative framework, with similar virtues.
3See Aruoba and Wright (2003), Rocheteau and Wright (2005), Lagos and Rocheteau (2005, 2008), Berentsen,
Camera and Waller (2007), among many others
4There are alternative mechanisms. Battaglini and Coate (2008) show that ineﬃciencies due to pork-barrel
spending provide an explanation for the distribution of (real) debt in the long-run. Diamond (1965), Aiyagari and
McGrattan (1998) and Shin (2006) provide a role for debt by using it to reduce some dynamic ineﬃciency.
5In equilibrium, distortions from monetary policy cannot be negative. This bound on policy is typical of monetary
economies, since no-arbitrage implies that in any monetary equilibrium the marginal value of money cannot exceed
the marginal value of nominal bonds.
2discontinuities at an inﬁnite but countable number of critical debt levels.
When net nominal government obligations are positive, both ﬁscal and monetary policies are
distortionary, and there exists a unique, stable steady state. Thus, for positive analysis one can
restrict attention to positive net nominal government obligations. Under a set of conditions, long-
run debt is shown to be larger than zero, as typically observed in actual economies.
Government policy depends critically on the curvature of consumption and the measure of
buyers in anonymous (i.e., cash-based) markets, since both features aﬀect how the government
internalizes the cost of inﬂation and by extension, how costly it is to reduce the real value of
inherited nominal debt. The ﬁrst channel is also found in standard cash-in-advance models,6
whereas the second arises here since the model explicitly features a double coincidence of wants
problem.
On the normative side, there are two main results. First, if the economy is at the steady
state with positive net nominal obligations, then a reform that endows the government with a
commitment technology has no eﬀect on policy. This result arises despite the fact that both ﬁscal
and monetary policies are distortionary in steady state, which contrasts with previous ﬁndings that
link time-consistency with optimality of the Friedman rule (see Alvarez, Kehoe and Neumeyer,
2004). For debt levels outside the steady state, the welfare loss due to lack of commitment is
estimated to be quite low. For example, for debt levels between zero and twice the post-war U.S.
average, the welfare cost in a calibrated economy is at most equivalent to a one-time fee of 0.04%
of a year’s consumption.
Second, assuming parameters are such that steady state debt is positive, governments choose
optimally to issue illiquid bonds, i.e., bonds that cannot be used as means of payment in some
markets. This result presumes that the government is unable to change the liquidity properties
of inherited debt. Furthermore, if society could commit to either liquid or illiquid government
bonds, then starting at zero debt, it would choose to have illiquid bonds or equivalently impose a
cash-in-advance constraint on some goods. In contrast to Kocherlakota (2003), illiquid bonds are
essential here, not because they allow agents to intertemporally exchange money, but because they
allow the government to trade distortions across periods.
In a closely related paper, Aruoba and Chugh (2008) formulate the Ramsey problem in the
Lagos-Wright environment and provide some important new insights on optimal policy. In terms
of the questions posed here, however, their approach is subject to the usual criticism of the Ram-
sey framework: the policy prescription is generically time-inconsistent and the model oﬀers no
meaningful prediction for the long-run level of debt (and thus, policy in general).
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the environment. Section 3 derives the
monetary equilibrium given government policy. Section 4 formulates the government’s problem,
characterizes equilibrium policy and derives the main theoretical results. Section 5 provides ana-
lytical and numerical analyses using suitable functional forms. Section 6 concludes.
6See D´ ıaz-Gim´ enez, Giovannetti, Marim´ on and Teles (2008) and Martin (2009).
32 Environment
The environment is a variant of Lagos and Wright (2005). There is a continuum of inﬁnitely
lived agents. Each period, two perfectly competitive markets open in sequence: a day and a night
market. In each stage a perishable good is produced and consumed. Before each day market opens,
agents receive an idiosyncratic shock that determines whether they can produce or consume the
day-good, x. With probability η ∈ (0,1) an agent wants to consume but cannot produce, while
with probability 1−η an agent can produce but does not want consume. A consumer derives utility
u(x), where u is twice continuously diﬀerentiable, with ux > 0 and uxx < 0, and satisﬁes Inada
conditions. A producer incurs in utility cost f(x), where f is twice continuously diﬀerentiable with
fx > 0 and fxx ≥ 0. Given the assumptions on u and f there exists a unique ˆ x ∈ (0,∞) such that
ux(ˆ x) = fx(
ηˆ x
1−η).
Assume agents lack commitment and are anonymous, in the sense that private trading histories
are unobservable. Thus, no private credit is possible. Since the day market features a lack of double
coincidence of wants problem, some medium of exchange is essential for trade to occur.7
At night, all agents can produce and consume the night-good, c. The production technology is
assumed to be linear in hours worked. Utility from consumption is given by U(c), where U is twice
continuously diﬀerentiable, with Uc > 0, Ucc < 0, and satisﬁes Inada conditions. Disutility from
labor is given by αn, where n is hours worked and α > 0. Let ˆ c ∈ (0,∞) such that Uc(ˆ c) = α.
There is a benevolent government that supplies a valued public good g. To ﬁnance its expen-
diture, the government may use proportional labor taxes τ, print ﬁat money at rate µ and issue
one-period nominal bonds, which are redeemable in ﬁat money. The public good is transformed
one-to-one from the night-good. Agents derive utility from the public good according to v(g),
where v is twice continuously diﬀerentiable, with vg > 0, vgg < 0, and satisﬁes Inada conditions.
Let ˆ g ∈ (0,∞) such that vg(ˆ g) = α.
The government can commit to policies within the period, but lacks the ability to commit to
future policy choices. To characterize government policy with lack of commitment, I adopt the
notion of Markov-perfect equilibrium, i.e., where policy is a function of fundamentals only.8
Assume the government announces its policy for the period at the beginning of the day, before
agents’ preference shocks are realized. The government only actively participates in the night-
market, i.e., taxes are levied on hours worked at night and open market operations are conducted
in the night market. As in Aruoba and Chugh (2008) and Berentsen and Waller (2008), public
bonds are book-entries in the government’s record. Since bonds are not physical objects and the
government does not participate in the day market (i.e., cannot intermediate or provide third-
party veriﬁcation), bonds are not used as a medium of exchange in the day market and thus,
money is essential. Alternatively, we could assume that bonds—but not money—can be costlessly
counterfeited.9 Again, bonds will only be traded in markets where the government participates.
Government bonds are then illiquid as in Kocherlakota (2003). In section 4, I show that governments
7See Kocherlakota (1998), Wallace (2001) and Shi (2006).
8See Maskin and Tirole (2001) for a deﬁnition and justiﬁcation of this solution concept. For applications to dynamic
policy games see Klein, Krusell and R´ ıos-Rull (2008), D´ ıaz-Gim´ enez, Giovannetti, Marim´ on and Teles (2008) and
Martin (2009), among others.
9There are several examples in the literature where ﬁat money is assumed to be the only recognizable asset in
certain markets. E.g., see Aruoba, Waller and Wright (2007) and Telyukova and Wright (2008).
4would optimally choose to issue illiquid bonds, under certain conditions consistent with actual
economies.
All nominal variables—except for bond prices—are normalized by the aggregate money stock.
Thus, today’s aggregate money supply is equal to 1 and tomorrow’s is 1 + µ. The government
budget constraint is
1 + B + pg = pτn + (1 + µ)(1 + qB0), (1)
where B is the current aggregate bond-money ratio, p is the—normalized—market price of the
night-good c, and q is the price of a bond that earns one unit of ﬁat money in the following night
market. “Primes” denote variables evaluated in the following period. Thus, B0 is tomorrow’s
aggregate bond-money ratio.
3 Monetary Equilibrium
In this section, I derive the conditions that characterize a monetary equilibrium for a given gov-
ernment policy.
3.1 The night market
An agent arrives to the night market with individual money balances m and government bonds b.
Since bonds are redeemed in ﬁat money at par, the composition of an agent’s nominal portfolio at
the beginning of the night is irrelevant. Let z ≡ m + b, i.e., total—normalized—nominal holdings.
The budget constraint of an agent at night is
pc + (1 + µ)(m0 + qb0) = p(1 − τ)n + z. (2)
Notice that the composition of the nominal portfolio the agent decides to carry over to the next
period matters, as only ﬁat money is used to buy goods in the day market.
Let V (m,b) be the value of entering the day market with money balances m and bond balances
b, and let W(z) be the value of entering the night market with total nominal balances z. After






α(z − (1 + µ)(m0 + qb0))
p(1 − τ)
+ v(g) + βV (m0,b0).














b = 0. (5)
5Assuming a symmetric equilibrium, we can follow Lagos and Wright (2005) to show that (4) and
(5) imply all agents exit the night market with the same money and bond balances.10 Furthermore,
the value function W is linear, Wz = α
p(1−τ). Both results follow from labor entering linearly in
the objective function and the budget constraint. The linearity of W allows us to write W(z) =
W(0) + αz
p(1−τ).







Thus, if V 0
b < V 0
m, i.e., if the value of entering tomorrow’s day market with a unit of bonds is less
than with a unit of money, then agents need to be compensated to acquire bonds, i.e., q < 1.
3.2 The day market
The ex-ante value for an agent that enters the day market is V (m,b) = ηV c(m,b)+(1−η)V p(m,b),
where V c and V p are the values of being a consumer and a producer in the day market, respectively.
A consumer faces a day-budget constraint, ˜ px ≤ m, where ˜ p is the—normalized—market price
of good x. Using ξ as the Lagrange multiplier associated with this constraint, the problem of a
consumer can be written as
V c(m,b) = max
x
u(x) + W(0) +
α(m + b − ˜ px)
p(1 − τ)
+ ξ(m − ˜ px).




− ξ˜ p = 0, (7)
which implies ξ = ux
˜ p − α
p(1−τ). From the envelope condition we get V c
m = α




p(1−τ). In terms of a consumer’s decision during the day, the amount of money brought into
the period matters—the budget constraint is typically binding—whereas bond holdings do not.
In general, the individual quantities consumed and produced are diﬀerent. Let y be an individual
producer’s output of the day-good. The problem of a producer is
V p(m,b) = max
y
−f(y) + W(0) +
α(m + b + ˜ py)
p(1 − τ)
.





Note that because of quasi-linear preferences in the night stage, a producer’s actions during the day
are unaﬀected by the amount of money or bonds he brings into the period. The envelope condition
10One minor caveat is that V is linear in b and hence, a non-degenerate distribution of bonds is possible in
equilibrium. Thus, the focus is on symmetric equilibria. Note that the agent’s day problem is unaﬀected by bond
holdings (see below), while at night the agent only cares about total nominal holdings. See Aruoba and Chugh (2008)
























A standard result is that consumers spend all their money in the day market, i.e., m = ˜ px. The
market clearing condition is then η = (1−η)˜ py, which implies ˜ p = 1
x. Substitute this expression in





where y satisﬁes (11). Then, from (9) and (10) we get Vm = x(ηux + (1 − η)fy) and Vb = fyx.
Equation (7) can be written as ξ = x(ux − fy). In a monetary equilibrium ξ ≥ 0, which implies
ux − fy ≥ 0, i.e., Vm ≥ Vb. This inequality holds in every period and thus, q ≤ 1.
As described above, all agents choose the same c, m0 and b0 in the night market. Thus, in
equilibrium, m0 = 1 and b0 = B0. The only relevant diﬀerence between agents is their role in the
day market and the corresponding labor eﬀort in the night market. It is easy to verify that the
aggregate resource constraint in the night market is satisﬁed, i.e.,
c + g = n. (13)
We can now collect the remaining equations that summarize agents’ behavior in any given period.
After some rearrangement we can write equations (3), (4), (6), (7) and (12) as
µ =
βx0(ηu0
















x + (1 − η)f0
y
(17)
ux − fy ≥ 0, (18)
where y,y0 satisfy (11). As described above, (18) comes from the requirement that the Lagrange
multiplier in the day-consumer’s problem, ξ, be non-negative.
74 Government Policy
In this section, I ﬁrst formulate the problem of the government with lack of commitment and deﬁne
a Markov-perfect monetary equilibrium. Second, I characterize the theoretical properties of the
equilibrium. Third, I analyze policy in the long-run. Fourth, I establish conditions under which
illiquid bonds are optimal. Fifth, I explore the role of commitment.
4.1 Problem of the government
As mentioned above, the government is benevolent, but can only commit to within-period policy
choices. Thus, in any given period, the problem of the current government is to maximize agents’
present value utility subject to its budget constraint. Note that the government budget constraint is
a function of agents’ competitive behavior and future government policy. Use equilibrium conditions
(13) to (17) to write the government budget constraint (1) as
(Uc − α)c − αg + βηx0(u0
x − f0
y) + βf0
yx0(1 + B0) − fyx(1 + B) = 0. (19)
The equation above is a function of B, B0, x, x0, c and g. All these variables are chosen in
the current period, except for x0, which is a function of the policy implemented by the government
tomorrow. In turn, future government policy is a function of the state variable, i.e., the bond-to-
money ratio. Thus, let x0 = X(B0), where X is the policy that the current government expects its
future-self to follow. Given y =
ηx
1−η and y0 =
ηX(B0)
1−η , we can write the government budget constraint
compactly as ε(B,B0,x,X(B0),c,g) = 0. In the analysis that follows, we will make frequent use
of the partial derivatives of this expression. Speciﬁcally, we have: εB = −fyx; εB0 = βf0
yx0;
εx = −(1 + B)(fy + fyyy); εx0 = β{η(u0
x + u0
xxx0) + (1 − η + B0)(f0
y + f0
yyy0)}; εc = Uc − α + Uccc;
and εg = −α.
The expression for εx shows how the level of debt aﬀects monetary policy. If 1 + B > 0, then
the government would like to reduce x to relax its budget constraint. From (14), a lower x is
implemented through a higher µ. In other words, if net nominal obligations are positive, then the
government has an incentive to use inﬂation to reduce the real value of its ﬁnancial burden. On the
other hand, if 1+B < 0 then the government has the opposite incentive. In this case, (18) becomes
a binding constraint, since we restrict the current government to implement policies consistent with
a monetary equilibrium.




ηu(x) − (1 − η)f(y) + U(c) − α(c + g) + v(g) + βV(B0)
subject to
ε(B,B0,x,X(B0),c,g) = 0
ux − fy ≥ 0.
8Deﬁnition 1 Let Γ ≡ [BL,BH], where −∞ < BL < BH < ∞. A Markov-Perfect Monetary
Equilibrium (MPME) is a set of functions {B,X,C,G,V} : R → R5, such that for all B ∈ Γ:
(i) {B(B),X(B),C(B),G(B)} = argmax
B0∈Γ,x,c,g
ηu(x) − (1 − η)f(y) + U(c) − α(c + g) + v(g) + βV(B0)
subject to ε(B,B0,x,X(B0),c,g) = 0, ux − fy ≥ 0, where y =
ηx
1−η and y0 =
ηX(B0)
1−η ; and




+ U(C(B)) − α(C(B) + G(B)) + v(G(B)) + βV(B(B)).
The bounds on debt speciﬁed above are necessary for a proper deﬁnition of the equilibrium at
this point, since equations (18) and (19) are not suﬃcient to characterize a monetary equilibrium,
which is a standard feature in this type of problem. Speciﬁcally, (18) and (19) do not rule out
the possibility of the government running a Ponzi-scheme. Due to the lack-of-commitment friction,
there is no single government on which we can impose an additional present-value “pay-back” (i.e.,
no Ponzi games) constraint. I will address this issue below by showing a more general property of
the MPME, which in turn rules-out Ponzi schemes. The characterization of the equilibrium that
follows will not rely on speciﬁc bounds on debt.
4.2 Equilibrium characterization
The problem of the government is not a standard dynamic programming problem, since the current
government takes X(B), i.e., the policy of future governments, as given. Solving for a MPME
involves ﬁnding the ﬁxed point of both V(B) and X(B). If these two functions are diﬀerentiable
(a.e.), we can use the ﬁrst-order condition to further characterize the MPME. Typically, one would
impose diﬀerentiability of the policy functions as a reﬁnement on the Markov-perfect equilibrium
(more on this below). In this case however, since the non-negativity constraint (18) will bind for
some debt-levels, the restriction needs to be weaker.
Assumption 1 The current government expects future governments to implement policy X(B)
which is continuous and diﬀerentiable almost everywhere.
The assumption above rules out equilibria where policy functions are non-diﬀerentiable for non-
fundamental reasons. Speciﬁcally, if X(B) is expected to be discontinuous, the discontinuity may
be preserved in the policy response of the current government, since small changes in debt will
sometimes trigger big changes in future policy. However, the expected discontinuity would not be
rooted in environment fundamentals. These type of non-diﬀerentiable equilibria are an artifact
of the inﬁnite horizon, as they would typically not exist in versions of the economy with a ﬁnite
horizon (and appropriate terminal conditions for the value of money).11 Note that Assumption 1
does not rule out the possibility that other equilibrium policy functions are non-diﬀerentiable. In
fact, as shown below, B(B), C(B) and G(B) will all show discontinuities for certain debt levels.
11See Krusell and Smith (2003) and Martin (2009) for further characterization and discussion. Krusell, Martin and
R´ ıos-Rull (2006) analyze an economy in which the fundamental equilibrium is non-diﬀerentiable due to an endogenous
upper bound on debt.
9However, these discontinuities will be rooted in fundamentals; speciﬁcally, a “kink” in monetary
policy due to (18).
Using λ and ζ as the Lagrange multipliers associated with the constraints of the government’s
problem, the ﬁrst-order conditions are
λ(εB0 + εx0X 0
B) + βλ0ε0
B = 0 (20)







Uc − α + λεc = 0 (22)
−α + vg + λεg = 0, (23)
where we use the envelope condition, VB = λεB, to simplify (20).
Notice that (20) has the derivative of the unknown function X, evaluated at B0. For this reason,
this equation is usually referred to as a Generalized Euler Equation (GEE). The presence of X 0
B
reﬂects the time-consistency problem: the current government takes into account how its actions
aﬀect tomorrow’s government decisions, whereas the government tomorrow does not internalize
how its policy aﬀected past decisions.
Let us now take a closer look at the dynamic incentives faced by the government. Notice that
εB0 = −βε0
B = βf0
yx0 and thus, (20) can be written as
βf0
yx0(λ − λ0) + λεx0X 0
B = 0, (24)
where, from (22) and (23), it follows that λ is a direct measure of the distortions created by current
policy. Since εB0 = −βε0
B, the governments assign equal weight to distortions today and tomorrow.
Thus, the term βf0
yx0(λ − λ0) in (24) is the standard trade-oﬀ between these distortions. Absent
any other margins, this term implies the government would perfectly smooth distortions over time,
i.e., set λ = λ0. This is what the debt model by Barro (1979) would imply in the absence of shocks,
and is also a typical feature of models with government commitment, where policy is constant after
the initial period (see section 4.5 below). However, as explained above, with lack of commitment,
the term λεx0X 0
B in (24) appears. In this case, how the current government substitutes distortions
across periods depends crucially on how future policy reacts to diﬀerent levels of inherited debt.
This is the channel through which monetary policy aﬀects debt policy.
The following auxiliary result will be useful in the analysis of the equilibrium. For clarity of
exposition, all proofs are in the Appendix.
Lemma 1 In a MPME, λ = 0 if and only if {ˆ x,ˆ c, ˆ g} is implemented in the current and all future
periods.
In other words, λ = 0 if and only if the ﬁrst-best is implemented. The Lemma implies that a
government will not implement the ﬁrst-best allocation {ˆ x,ˆ c, ˆ g} in the current period if there are
distortions in the future. From (19), the steady state debt level that implements the ﬁrst-best is
ˆ B = −1 −
αˆ g
(1 − β)ˆ uxˆ x
.
10Examining the problem of the government and the ﬁrst-order conditions, it seems plausible
that there exists a MPME featuring X(B) = ˆ x for all B. Suppose this is the case. Hence,
XB = 0 for all B and thus, from (24), λ = λ0. Then, (22) and (23) imply c = c0 and g = g0.
Note that εx < 0 for B > −1, which from (21) implies λ = ζ = 0 for all B > −1. Given this
policy, it is also feasible to implement {ˆ x,ˆ c, ˆ g} for B ≤ −1. Thus, our candidate equilibrium is
{X(B) = ˆ x,C(B) = ˆ c,G(B) = ˆ g}, where from (19), B(B) =
αˆ g
βˆ uxˆ x + 1+B
β − 1. In other words, the
government implements the ﬁrst-best in every period through a Ponzi-scheme of ever-increasing
debt. The proposition below shows that this policy cannot be an equilibrium, while establishing a
more general property of the MPME in this environment.
Proposition 1 There does not exist a MPME with XB = 0 for all B > ˆ B.
Thus, we rule out the existence of equilibria where the government perfectly smoothes distortions
across periods for all levels of debt—see (24). Consequently, in any MPME the allocation of the
day-good is necessarily distorted for some levels of debt.
Given the above results, we can proceed with the analysis of the equilibrium. From (23) we
have λ =
vg
α − 1. After some substitutions, the system of equations characterizing the MPME is:
βf0
yx0(vg − v0
g) + (vg − α)εx0X 0
B = 0 (25)







vg(Uc − α) + (vg − α)Uccc = 0 (27)
(Uc − α)c − αg + βηx0(u0
x − f0
y) + βf0
yx0(1 + B0) − fyx(1 + B) = 0, (28)
ux − fy ≥ 0, ζ ≥ 0 and ζ(ux − fy) = 0.
Some results are intractable for general speciﬁcations, as they depend on the properties of the
third derivatives of some functions. The following assumptions are suﬃcient to provide the desired
results.
Assumption 2 The following conditions hold: (i) 2fxx + fxxxx ≥ 0 for x ∈ (0, ˆ x]; and (ii)
Uccc − (Uc − α)(1 + Ucccc
Ucc ) < 0 for c ∈ (0,ˆ c].
Note that these requirements are quite weak. For example, both are satisﬁed if we assume that
f(x) = xγ
γ and U(c) = c1−ρ
1−ρ , γ,ρ > 0, a common assumption.
Proposition 2 A Markov-Perfect Monetary Equilibrium (MPME) is characterized by critical debt
levels ˆ B < ˜ B∞ < ... < ˜ B0 < −1 < B∗, such that:
(i) X(B) = ˆ x for all B ≤ −1 and X(B) < ˆ x for all B > −1.
(ii) C(B) = ˆ c and G(B) = ˆ g for all B ≤ ˆ B; and C(B) < ˆ c and G(B) < ˆ g for all B > ˆ B.
(iii) B(B) =
αˆ g
βˆ uxˆ x + 1+B
β − 1 for all B ≤ ˆ B.
(iv) B(B) = B for all B ∈ [ ˆ B, ˜ B∞].
11(v) B( ˜ B0) = −1. There exist critical points ˜ Bj = (1 + ˜ B0)
1−βj+1
1−β − 1, j = 0,...,∞, such that:
B, C and G are discontinuous at these critical points; B( ˜ Bj) = ˜ Bj−1, C( ˜ Bj) = C( ˜ B0) and
G( ˜ Bj) = G( ˜ B0) for all j = 1,...,∞.
(vi) B(B) > −1 and X 0
B < 0 for all B ≥ −1.
(vii) B(B∗) = B∗.
The policy implications of Proposition 2 are straightforward: (i) tax rates are zero for all
B ≤ ˆ B and positive for all B > ˆ B; and (ii) monetary policy is non-distortionary for all B ≤ −1
and distortionary for all B > −1. Figure 1 provides a more complete characterization of the
MPME, using numerical methods to solve the equilibrium.12 It assumes the following functional
forms: u(x) = x1−σ−1
1−σ ; f(x) = x; U(c) = logc; v(g) = logg. Parameter values are α = 2, β = 0.75,
η = 0.5 and σ = 2. These assumptions imply ˆ B = −5, B∗ = 1.5 and C(B) = G(B).
The ﬁrst-best is implemented for any B ≤ ˆ B. The “kink” in X at B = −1 caused by the non-
negativity constraint (18), introduces some discontinuities in government policy for B ∈ ( ˆ B, ˜ B0].
Speciﬁcally, debt is kept constant for some initial range and is a discontinuous function afterwards.
There is an inﬁnite and uncountable number of steady states and an inﬁnite but countable number
critical points at which debt “jumps”. As analyzed above, if X 0
B = 0, the current government will
equate today’s and tomorrow’s distortions. For B ∈ ( ˆ B, ˜ B∞], the government perfectly smoothes
distortions across time, even though it does not implement the ﬁrst-best. For B ∈ ( ˜ B∞, ˜ B0], the
government equates distortions across a ﬁnite number of periods, at the cost of increasing debt.
Eventually, debt becomes large enough (i.e., government claims on the private sector become small
enough) that the current government expects future governments to start distorting the allocation
of the day-good—the incentives to inﬂate grow with debt—and thus, no longer has incentives to
perfectly smooth distortions across periods.
For B ≥ −1, the MPME is well-behaved (in the sense that there are no discontinuities in policy
stemming from fundamentals) and features a unique steady state, B∗. Furthermore, the money
growth rate is always above the Friedman rule. Note also that B(B) > −1 for all B ≥ −1. Thus,
for positive applications of the theory we can focus on B ≥ −1.
4.3 Long-run debt
In this section, we analyze the properties of B∗. This steady state features ε∗
x0 = 0—see (24) and







yyy∗) = 0 (29)
v∗
g(U∗
c − α) + (v∗
g − α)U∗
ccc∗ = 0 (30)
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12The numerical computation of Markov-perfect equilibria for dynamic policy games has been described extensively
elsewhere. The method used here follows the projection algorithm described in Martin (2009) with the caveat that
one needs to account for the (countable) discontinuities in policy. The code is available upon request.






































































yyy∗ − 1 + η. (32)
Figure 1 suggests this steady state is stable, which makes the theory suitable for positive
analysis. For a limiting case, we can prove this property.
Proposition 3 Assume vg = ψg−ν, ψ > α, ν > 0. Then, as ν → 0, B(B) → B∗ for all B ≥ −1.
Countries typically feature positive amounts of government debt. The following proposition
relates long-run debt to the model’s fundamentals.









x > 1; (iii) as η → 0, B∗ → −1; and (iv) if ux = x−σ, σ > 0, and fx = φ > 0, then ησ > 1
is a suﬃcient condition for B∗ > 0.
As we can see, critical for long-run debt are the curvature of the utility function for the day-
good, u(x), and the measure of buyers in the day market, η. Given part (i) of Proposition 4, if u(x)
features a constant intertemporal elasticity-of-substitution, then its curvature needs to be higher
than log for debt to be positive in the long-run (this condition is also suﬃcient as the measure
of buyers approaches one—part (ii)). This result is caused by the fact that the curvature in u
determines how distortionary the inﬂation tax is. A high curvature in u implies inﬂation is very
costly to the agent, which means the (benevolent) government has low incentives to use inﬂation and
thus, high incentives to push the burden of taxation to the future, i.e., increase debt. The measure
of buyers plays a crucial role as well, since it weights the distortion costs caused by inﬂation. Part
(iii) shows that as this weight converges to zero, inﬂation is heavily used to reduce the ﬁnancial
burden of debt, which converges to −1 in the long-run. Part (iv) provides a suﬃcient condition for
positive long-run debt, for typically used functional forms.
One implication of Proposition 4 is that under the parameterization of Lagos and Wright (2005)
and most of the subsequent literature, which feature σ < 1, the economy would converge to negative
government debt in the long-run.
4.4 Liquid or illiquid bonds?
Positive long-run debt is not only relevant for the analysis of actual economies, but also necessary
for illiquid bond to be socially optimal. To see this, note that since money is neutral in this envi-
ronment, issuing only liquid bonds—i.e., bonds that are perfect substitutes of money—is equivalent
to setting end-of-period debt to zero. Suppose we allow the government to choose whether to issue
either liquid or illiquid bonds, but assume it cannot change the liquidity properties of inherited
debt.13 This option is equivalent to choosing between zero debt and some other level, a decision
which is already accounted for in the government’s problem. Assuming B(B) is increasing in B and
13If the government could make illiquid bonds liquid at the beginning of the period, it would always choose to do
so since it amounts to a non-distortionary default on debt.
14parameters are such that B∗ > 0, then B(B) > 0 for all B ≥ 0. In other words, the government
prefers to issue illiquid bonds.
A related question is what institution society would select. Suppose we start with zero debt
and allow society to commit to either having liquid or illiquid bonds. The choice now is between
the MPME as characterized above and the allocation associated with zero debt in every period. If
parameters are such that B∗ > 0, then B(0) > 0, i.e., at zero debt the government always prefers
to issue some. Since the government is benevolent, this means that agents’ welfare is improved if
we allow the government to issue illiquid bonds. Thus, society would choose to make government
bonds illiquid or, equivalently, impose a cash-in-advance constraint in the day market.
The results here are related to Kocherlakota (2003), where illiquid bonds are essential since
they allow agents to trade money intertemporally. In contrast, here, illiquid bonds are optimal
since they allow the government to trade-oﬀ distortions across periods.
4.5 Time-consistency and commitment
As mentioned above, we have ε∗
x0 = 0. That is, even though small changes in debt choice at B∗ have
an eﬀect on future policy (given that X ∗
B < 0), the positive and negative eﬀects of these changes on
the current government budget constraint are balanced out. In other words, the time-consistency
problem, which is driving the change in debt, cancels out at the steady state. It follows that if
the governments starts at B∗, it will stay there, regardless of its ability to commit. The following
statement formalizes this argument.
Proposition 5 Suppose initial debt is equal to B∗. Then a government with commitment and a
government without commitment will both implement the allocation {x∗,c∗,g∗} and choose debt
level B∗ in every period.
This result has important implications for institutional reform as it shows that endowing a
government at B∗ with a commitment technology would have no eﬀect on policy.14 It also shows
that time-consistency of policy under commitment is not necessarily linked to optimality of the
Friedman rule (e.g., see Alvarez, Kehoe and Neumeyer, 2004). The key elements for the result
in Proposition 5 are two: ﬁrst, the government weights current and future distortions equally
(εB0 = −βε0
B), which is a standard feature; and second, the time-consistency problem is internalized
through a single good—the term εx0X 0
B in (24). One way to break this result, without abandoning
the Lagos-Wright framework, is to assume non-separable preferences in x and c. In this case, the
extra term εc0C0
B would appear in the GEE and typically, we would not obtain εx0 = εc0 = 0.
Proposition 5 begs the question of how the MPME and the Ramsey policy compare for any
level of initial debt. The derivation of the Ramsey policy is well understood and thus, omitted
here.15 Figure 2 compares debt and monetary policy with and without commitment, as a function
of initial debt, B0 ∈ [ ˆ B,2B∗], using the same parameterization as in Figure 1. Graph with tax
rates and expenditure are omitted to save space. With commitment, both taxes and government
14Note however, that a commitment technology would still signiﬁcantly aﬀect how policy reacts to shocks.
15See the proof of Proposition 5 for the formulation of the Ramsey problem and some basic results. See also Aruoba
and Chugh (2008) for a formulation and analysis of the Ramsey problem in a similar environment.
15Figure 2: Markov-Perfect and Ramsey Policies




























expenditure are constant in every period and a function of initial debt. In section 5.3, I evaluate
the welfare diﬀerences of these two regimes, for a calibrated economy.
The left panel of Figure 2 compares debt policy. As is typically the case in stationary environ-
ments, a government with commitment changes debt in the ﬁrst period and never again. Thus,
there are two debt policies, one for the initial period and one for all other periods (the 45-degree
line). Note that any level of debt can be supported in the long-run, independent of the environment
fundamentals. There are three debt levels where long-run debt is equal to initial debt (regardless of
parameterization): ˆ B, −1 and B∗. Also worth mentioning is that the Ramsey government reduces
debt in the ﬁrst period for B0 ∈ ( ˆ B,−1), which contrasts with the policy in the MPME. The
diﬀerence in behavior is due to the Ramsey government not implementing the Friedman rule for
any B0 > ˆ B, as explained below.
The right panel of Figure 2 compares monetary policy. The Ramsey planner features two
policies: one for the initial period and one for all other periods, both shown as function of initial
debt. One important feature is that ˆ x is never implemented after the initial period for B0 > ˆ B,
a fact also highlighted in Aruoba and Chugh (2008). Thus, even though ˆ x is implemented in the
initial period for all B ≤ −1, the Friedman rule is never implemented for any B0 > ˆ B. In contrast,
a government that lacks commitment implements the Friedman rule for all B ≤ ˜ B0. An important
diﬀerence then is that a Ramsey government typically distorts the economy using both ﬁscal and
monetary instruments, whereas a Markov government uses both distortions only when net nominal
obligations are positive.
5 Parameterized Analysis
I will now rely on speciﬁc functional forms to conduct some analytical and numerical analysis.
First, I will make suﬃcient assumptions to solve the model analytically and perform some steady
16state comparative statics. Second, I will show a calibration that matches selected statistics for the
U.S. economy. Third, I use this calibration to evaluate the welfare loss due to lack of commitment.
Throughout this section, the following functional forms hold.
Assumption 3 u(x) = x1−σ−1
1−σ , f(x) = φx, U(c) = c1−ρ−1
1−ρ , v(g) = ψ
g1−ν−1
1−ν ; σ,φ,ρ,ψ,ν > 0.
5.1 Analytical characterization
Using suitable assumptions on parameters, we can characterize the MPME analytically and perform
some comparative statics at B∗. Although not a general proof, this example establishes existence
of the equilibrium for a limiting case.
To allow for an analytical solution, let ρ → 1 and ν → 0. This last assumption enables us
to use the result from Proposition 3. Note that as ν → 0, ˆ g → ∞; thus, we focus on B ≥ −1.
Since now vg → ψ, we need to make additional assumptions to ensure the solution is interior. Let
1 − 1
σ < α
ψ < β. With these assumptions, the MPME converges to:
B(B) =
ηασ



















ψ − σ(ψ − α)
 σ−1
σ − (1 + B)
 ηα





for all B ≥ −1.
Proposition 6 Assuming 1 − 1
σ < α
ψ < β, as ρ → 1 and ν → 0 we get the following comparative
statics results at B∗.
(i) An increase in the disutility from labor α: (1) decreases taxes and inﬂation; (2) decreases
debt if σ > 1, increases debt if σ < 1 and has no eﬀect on debt if σ = 1.
(ii) An increase in the preference for the public good ψ: (1) increases taxes and inﬂation; (2)
increases debt if σ > 1, decreases debt if σ < 1 and has no eﬀect on debt if σ = 1; (3)
increases government expenditure.
(iii) A decrease in the intertemporal elasticity of substitution for the day-good, i.e., an increase
in σ: (1) has no eﬀect on taxes; (2) increases debt and inﬂation; (3) increases government






(iv) An increase in the measure of day-good consumers η: (1) has no eﬀect on taxes; (2) increases
inﬂation, debt and government expenditure.
17(v) An increase in the marginal cost of the day-good, φ: (1) does not aﬀect taxes, inﬂation or
debt; (2) increases government expenditure if σ > 1, decreases expenditure if σ < 1 and has
no eﬀect on expenditure if σ = 1.
Note several features from the proposition above. First and foremost, if σ > 1 (a necessary
condition for B∗ > 0), debt and inﬂation react in the same qualitative way to changes in parame-
ters. Second, increasing the disutility from labor has the same qualitative eﬀect as decreasing the
preference for the public good. The implication is that, for numerical work, we can safely normalize
ψ to 1. Third, decreasing the intertemporal elasticity of substitution has the same qualitative eﬀect
(with some caveats for expenditure) as increasing the measure of day-good consumers. Coupled
with part (iv) of Proposition 4, this result suggest that a steady state can be calibrated with dif-
ferent combinations of values for σ and η. Fourth, long-run debt and inﬂation are increasing in σ
and η. Fifth, changes in the marginal cost of producing the day-good have no eﬀect on long-run
government policy, except for the level of expenditure.
5.2 Calibration
The steady state B∗ can be easily calibrated to an actual economy. The model has deﬁnite predic-
tions for the following policy variables: debt, inﬂation, taxes, interest rate, expenditure and velocity
of circulation. All these variables enter the government budget constraint (indirectly in the case of
velocity); thus, we cannot target all of them since the constraint needs to be satisﬁed. I will take
the tax rate τ as the residual. This leaves 5 targets.
Under Assumption 3, the model is overidentiﬁed. Thus, set ψ = ν = 1, i.e., v(g) = lng, and
η = 0.5. The parameters left to calibrate are then: α, β, φ, ρ and σ. Table 1 summarizes the
parameter choice and calibration targets.
Table 1: Calibration Exercise
Target statistics
B(1 + µ)/Y µ G/Y 1/q − 1 Y
0.310 0.044 0.180 0.063 6.300
Parameter values
α β φ ρ σ
4.920 0.982 1.119 9.040 5.212
Note: ν = ψ = 1, η = 0.5.
All calibration targets are taken from U.S. annual data for the period 1962-2006. First, deﬁne
nominal GDP as the sum of nominal output in the day and night markets. Abusing notation slightly,
let Y be nominal GDP normalized by the aggregate money stock, i.e., Y = η˜ px + p(c + g). Let
C ≡ pc and G ≡ pg and recall that in equilibrium, ˜ px = 1. Given η = 0.5, we get Y = 0.5+C +G.
Note that by the equation of exchange, velocity of circulation is deﬁned as the nominal GDP divided
18by the aggregate money stock. Thus, the ﬁrst target is to set Y equal to the velocity of circulation
in the data. Following the literature, take M1 as the measure of money, which implies velocity is
6.3.
In steady state, the inﬂation rate is equal to the money growth rate, µ. Using the CPI as the
measure of the price level, the inﬂation rate for the period averaged 4.4% annual.
The third target is debt over GDP. In the data, government debt is measured at the end of the
period. Thus, the relevant numerator is B(1 + µ). Since B is the bond-to-money ratio, debt over
GDP is given by
B(1+µ)
Y . In the U.S., debt over GDP, excluding holdings by federal agencies and
the Federal Reserve Banks, averaged 31% between 1962 and 2006. Given that we are targeting
µ = 0.044 and Y = 6.3, this implies a target for B roughly equal to 1.871.
Evaluating (14) and (17) in steady state, we get q(1+µ) = β. Note that q is the inverse of the
gross nominal interest rate. Take the 1-year treasury constant maturity rate, which averaged 6.3%
annual in the period considered. Thus, β = 1.044
1.063 ≈ 0.982.
The last target is government expenditure. In the model, G represents nominal government
expenditure normalized by the aggregate money stock. In the data, federal government outlays,
net of debt interest payments (which the model accounts for in the discounted price of bonds, q),
averaged 18% per year in terms of GDP. Thus, we set G
Y = 0.18 or, equivalently, G = 1.134. This
also allows us to reexpress the target for velocity. We have Y = 0.5+C +G = 6.3. Given, Y = 6.3
and G = 1.134, this implies C = 4.666.
The strategy now is to choose α, φ, ρ and σ so that solving (29)—(32) implies B = 1.871,
µ = 0.044, C = 4.666 and G = 1.134. Note that using (1), we can write labor taxes in terms of the




We can use the calibration to evaluate the welfare loss due to lack of commitment in this environ-
ment. Speciﬁcally, given initial debt B0, I calculate the one-time fee that the agent is willing to
pay to switch from the MPME to the Ramsey policy, expressed in terms of period-consumption.
That is, the function ∆(B0) that satisﬁes




+ U(C(B0)(1 + ∆(B0)))
−α(C(B0) + G(B0)) + v(G(B0)) + βV(B(B0)) = V R(B0), (33)
where V R(B0) is the present value utility under the Ramsey policy, given initial debt B0.
Table 2 shows the equivalent compensation measure ∆ for selected debt levels. As a reference,
the table includes the corresponding level of debt over GDP, measured at the beginning of the
period. Given the calibration parameters, ˜ B∞ actually features the highest ∆: 0.43%. Note that
this is not a general result (e.g., using the parameterization of section 4.2, ∆ peaks somewhere in
between ˜ B∞ and ˜ B0). For more empirically relevant debt levels, say between 0 and 2B∗, ∆ is
at most 0.04%, which is quite low when compared to typical welfare measures in macroeconomics
(e.g., the cost of business cycles or the cost of 10% annual inﬂation).
19Table 2: Welfare loss due to lack of commitment
B B/Y ∆
ˆ B −9.99 0.00%
˜ B∞ −2.31 0.43%






The model presented in this paper features some attractive properties for further policy analysis.
The steady state with positive net nominal government liabilities is unique, highly tractable and
features positive taxes and inﬂation above the Friedman rule. It is straightforward to verify that
these properties would survive a number of extensions to the basic environment; e.g., trading
frictions in the day market and productivity and/or government expenditure shocks. Whether these
extensions have any implications for the determination of government policy is work currently in
progress.
20A Proofs
A.1 Proof of Lemma 1
Suppose λ = 0. Then from (22) and (23), we get c = ˆ c and g = ˆ g; from (21) we get ux−fy = ζ = 0,
i.e., x = ˆ x. From (20) λ0 = 0, which from (21)—(23) implies x0 = ˆ x, c0 = ˆ c and g0 = ˆ g. Suppose
now that x = x0 = ˆ x, c = c0 = ˆ c and g = g0 = ˆ g. Then, equations (21)—(23) all imply λ = 0.
A.2 Proof of Proposition 1
Suppose XB = 0, i.e., x is constant for all B in a MPME. From (24), XB = 0 implies λ = λ0. At
B = −1, εx = 0 and so (21) becomes η(ux−fy)+ζ(uxx−
ηfyy
1−η ) = 0. The only solution is x = ˆ x, ζ = 0.
Thus, X(B) = ˆ x. Consider now B > −1. Since x = ˆ x, (21) is −λ(1+B)( ˆ fy+ ˆ fyyˆ y)+ζ(ˆ uxx−
η ˆ fyy
1−η ) =
0, where λ = ζ = 0 is the only solution. Thus, c = ˆ c, g = ˆ g and from (19), B(B) =
αˆ g
βˆ uxˆ x + 1+B
β − 1
for all B > −1. If we plug this debt function into (19) for B ≤ −1, we get that c = ˆ c, g = ˆ g,
λ = ζ = 0 is also a solution to (20)—(23). Thus, the MPME features the ﬁrst-best for all B.
The implied policy is ˆ µ = β − 1, ˆ τ = 0, ˆ q = 1 and ˆ p = α
ˆ uxˆ x for all B. The value function is
V(B) = ˆ V ≡
ηu(ˆ x)+(1−η)f(ˆ y)+U(ˆ c)−α(ˆ c+ˆ g)+v(ˆ g)
1−β .
A day-market consumer arrives to the night market with nominal balances equal to B and
works ˆ nc = ˆ c
1−ˆ τ −
B−(1+ˆ µ)(m0+ˆ qb0)
ˆ p(1−ˆ τ) = ˆ c −
ˆ uxˆ x(B−β(m0+b0))
α . If he does not deviate, he chooses m0 = 1
and b0 = B(B) and hence works ˆ nc = ˆ c + ˆ g + ˆ uxˆ x
α . Thus, the equilibrium pay-oﬀ for a consumer at
night is ˆ Wc = U(ˆ c) − α(ˆ c + ˆ g) − ˆ uxˆ x + v(ˆ g) + β ˆ V .
Consider now a consumer that deviates at night in the following way: he still consumes ˆ c
and chooses m0 = 1, but now he sells all his bonds, i.e., b0 = 0 and saves on work accordingly.
After the current period, the agent maintains a portfolio of zero bonds and ﬁnances his (ﬁrst-
best) consumption with ﬁat money and labor only. Thus, in future periods the agent works nd =
ˆ c+
ˆ uxˆ x(β−z)
α . Expected nominal balances z are equal to 1, and thus expected labor is ˆ c−
ˆ uxˆ x(1−β)
α .
The value of this continuation strategy is then Vd =
ηu(ˆ x)+(1−η)f(ˆ y)+U(ˆ c)−αˆ c+ˆ uxˆ x(1−β)+v(ˆ g)
1−β . In the
deviation period, the consumer chooses c = ˆ c, m0 = 1 and b0 = 0 and thus, works nc
d = ˆ c+
ˆ uxˆ x(β−B)
α .
The pay-oﬀ from deviating is Wc
d = U(ˆ c)−αˆ c−ˆ uxˆ x(β−B)+v(ˆ g)+βVd. A consumer has an incentive
to deviate only if Wc
d > ˆ Wc. After some simple algebra, this condition reduces to B > ˆ B. Thus,
there is a proﬁtable deviation from the equilibrium if debt is suﬃciently high. Given B(B) > B for
all B > ˆ B, agents have an incentive to deviate if the bond-money ratio is above ˆ B. Thus, XB = 0
for all B > ˆ B cannot be a MPME.
A.3 Proof of Proposition 2
A.3.1 Parts (ii) and (iii)
First note that regardless of B, if λ = 0 then by Lemma 1 the ﬁrst-best is being implemented.
In this case, the government budget constraint (19) implies B0 =
αˆ g
βˆ uxˆ x + 1+B
β − 1. For B > ˆ B,
21we have B0 > B, which implies that, in all periods, debt is rolled-over while the government




β −1 for B ≤ ˆ B is admissible and, since it maximizes agents welfare, is the equilibrium
policy. Thus, λ = 0 only for B ≤ ˆ B and we get (iii). Given λ > 0 for all B > ˆ B, part (ii) follows
from equations (22) and (23).
A.3.2 Part (i)
Consider (21), i.e., the ﬁrst-order condition with respect to x. From part (ii), x = ˆ x for B ≤ ˆ B.
Now focus on B > ˆ B, i.e, λ > 0. If B < −1 then η(ux − fy) − λ(1 + B)(fy + fyyy) > 0 and thus,
ζ > 0, which implies x = ˆ x. If B = −1 then ux − fy = ζ = 0 and thus, x = ˆ x. If B > −1 then
ux−fy > 0, ζ = 0 and thus, x < ˆ x. The assumptions on u and f guarantee that an interior solution
for x to η(ux − fy) = λ(1 + B)(fy + fyyy) exists.
A.3.3 Auxiliary lemmas
Lemma 2 B(B) is an injection.
Proof. Suppose not, i.e, there exist debt values B0 < B1 such that B(B0) = B(B1). Note that
this implies X(B(B0)) = X(B(B1)) and G(B(B0)) = G(B(B1)). Thus, (25) implies G(B0) = G(B1)
and so, (27) implies C(B0) = C(B1). The government budget constraint can thus be written
as fyx(1 + B) = K, where K does not depend on x or B. There are three cases to consider:
B0 < B1 ≤ −1; B0 ≤ −1 < B1; and −1 < B0 < B1. If B0 < B1 ≤ −1 then from part (i),
X(B0) = X(B1) = ˆ x and thus, the government budget constraint cannot be satisﬁed simultaneously
for B0 and B1. If B0 ≤ −1 < B1 then fyx(1 + B0) ≤ 0 and fyx(1 + B0) > 0; thus, the
government budget constraint cannot be satisﬁed at both debt levels. If −1 < B0 < B1, then
replace fyx(1 + B) = K in (26) and get αη(ux − fy) −
(vg−α)(fy+fyyy)K
fyx = 0, i.e., X(B0) = X(B1);
then, the government budget constraint cannot be satisﬁed for both B0 and B1, a contradiction.
Lemma 3 c changes in the same direction as g.
Proof. We focus on B > ˆ B, since for B ≤ ˆ B, both c and g are constant. Thus, λ > 0 from part




Fg = vgg(Uc − α + Uccc) > 0, since from (22), λ > 0 implies εc < 0, i.e., Uc − α + Uccc < 0. Thus,
to show dc
dg > 0 we need Fc < 0. We get Fc = vgUcc + (vg − α)(2Ucc + Ucccc), which using (27) can
be rewritten as Fc = Ucc − (Uc − α)(1
c + Uccc
Ucc ) < 0, given Assumption 2.
Lemma 4 For B > ˆ B, βf0
yx0 + εx0X 0
B > 0, i.e., increasing B0 relaxes the government budget
constraint.




yx = 0; thus, βf0
yx0 + εx0X 0
B > 0.
22A.3.4 Part (v)
We now show part (v). Deﬁne ˜ B0 ∈ ( ˆ B,−1) such that B( ˜ B0) = −1; by Lemma 2 there is at most
one such debt level. At ˜ B0, we have x = x0 = ˆ x and εx0 = βη(ˆ uxxˆ x − ˆ fyyˆ y) < 0. Diﬀerentiating
(26) with respect to B and evaluating this expression at B = −1 we get: αη(ˆ uxx −
η ˆ fyy
1−η ) ˆ XB −(vg −
α)( ˆ fy + ˆ fyyˆ y) = 0. Thus, XB < 0 at B = −1, i.e., X 0
B < 0 at B = ˜ B0. Then, from (28)
˜ B0 =
(˜ Uc − α)˜ c − α˜ g
ˆ uxˆ x
− 1,
where {˜ c, ˜ g} solve (25) and (27). Using the expression for ˆ XB derived above, we can simplify this
system of equations. We get












˜ vg(˜ Uc − α) + (˜ vg − α)˜ ucc˜ c = 0,
where “primes” denote the equilibrium values at B = −1. We now verify that ˜ B0 ∈ ( ˆ B,−1). First,
˜ B0 > ˆ B follows from part (iii), since B0 = −1 is not a solution to B(B) for B ≤ ˆ B. Second, since
v0
g − α > 0 from part (ii), the ﬁrst equation above implies ˆ g > ˜ g > g0, i.e., 0 < ˜ λ < λ0. Lemma
3 implies ˆ c > ˜ c > c0. Since compared to B = −1, the government at ˜ B0 is implementing a higher
utility allocation, ˜ x = x0, ˜ c > c0, ˜ g > g0, and is less constrained (0 < ˜ λ < λ0 and ˜ ζ = ζ0 = 0), it
must be that the ﬁnancial burden is lower, i.e., ˜ B0 < −1.
Notice that if we approach B0 from the left of −1, X 0
B = 0 from part (i). Thus, consider
approaching B0 = −1 from the left at B = ˜ B0. Then, X 0
B = 0 and (25) implies g = g0 < ˜ g and
hence, c = c0 < ˜ c from (27). But then, the government budget constraint (28) cannot be satisﬁed
at ˜ B0 since it is satisﬁed for {˜ c, ˜ g}, as described above. Given that the solution approaching from
the left and right are diﬀerent, the equilibrium is discontinuous in B, C, G (not X, since by part (i)
it is ﬂat in this range).
Having identiﬁed ˜ B0 and the discontinuity of the MPME at this debt level, focus on B ∈ ( ˆ B, ˜ B0)
and such that B(B) < −1 (we will verify this property below). Consider (24), i.e., βf0
yx0(λ − λ0) +
λε0
xX 0
B = 0. Since B ∈ ( ˆ B, ˜ B0) and B(B) < −1, we have λ,λ0 > 0 from part (ii), and x = ˆ x and
X 0
B = 0 from part (i). Therefore, (24) implies λ = λ0 > 0. Thus, either B0 = B and we are in (a
distortionary) steady state, or {c = c0 < ˆ c, g = g0 < ˆ g}, while debt changes. Suppose we are not in
steady state (a case we will cover in part (iv), below); then (28) implies
B(B) = −






Deﬁne ˜ B1 such that B( ˜ B1) = ˜ B0. Thus, c = ˜ c, g = ˜ g and ˜ B1 = (1 + ˜ B0)(1 + β) − 1. The
discontinuity of the equilibrium at ˜ B0 carries over at ˜ B1, since again the solutions from the left
and right diﬀer. We can proceed similarly by deﬁning B( ˜ Bj+1) = ˜ Bj for all j = 0,...,∞, and get




with C( ˜ Bj) = ˜ c and G( ˜ Bj) = ˜ g. At all this debt levels, the MPME is discontinuous in B, C and G.
Given ˜ B0 < −1, it is straightforward to verify that ˜ Bj < −1 for all j = 0,...,∞.
23A.3.5 Part (iv)
Equation (24) also allows for the possibility of being in steady state. Note that ˜ B∞ ≡ 1+ ˜ B0
1−β −1 is a
steady state. I.e., the government at ˜ B∞ has enough resources to perfectly smooth distortions over
time. Using the expression for ˜ B0, we can write ˜ B∞ =
(˜ Uc−α)˜ c−α˜ g
(1−β)ˆ uxˆ x − 1. Given ˜ c < ˆ c and ˜ g < ˜ g, we
verify ˜ B∞ > ˆ B. At ˜ B∞ the government is indiﬀerent between implementing {ˆ x,ˆ c, ˆ g} by staying at
˜ B∞, and rolling-oﬀ the debt as stated in part (v). Since for all B ∈ ( ˆ B, ˜ B∞), the government can
implement x = x = ˆ x, c = c0 ∈ (˜ c,ˆ c), g = g0 ∈ (˜ g, ˆ g) forever by keeping a constant debt, it strictly
prefers this policy to rolling-oﬀ debt. Hence, B(B) = B for B ∈ [ ˆ B, ˜ B∞].
A.3.6 Part (vi)
We ﬁrst show B(B) > −1 for all B ≥ −1. Suppose not. We can rule out B0 = −1 since from
part (v), B( ˜ B0) = −1, where ˜ B0 ∈ ( ˆ B,−1), and by Lemma 2 there is only one such point.
Thus, ﬁx some B ≥ −1 such that B0 < −1. Then, x ≤ ˆ x (strictly if B > −1), x0 = ˆ x and
X 0
B = 0; thus, (25) implies g = g0 < ˆ g (by part (ii)) and from (27), c = c0 < ˆ c. From (28)
we get (Uc − α)c − αg = fyx(1 + B) − β ˆ fyˆ x(1 + B0) > 0, given B ≥ −1 and B0 < −1. Let
K ≡ (Uc − α)c − αg > 0. Since c = c0 and g = g0, in the following period, (28) becomes
K = ˆ fyˆ x(1 + B0) − βηx00(u00
x − f00
y) − βf00
yx00(1 + B00). Given K > 0 and the ﬁrst two terms of the
right-hand side being jointly negative, we get B00 < −1 and thus, x00 = ˆ x, X 00
B = 0, c = c0 = c00,
g = g0 = g00. Thus, (28) simpliﬁes to K = ˆ fyˆ x(1 + B0 − β(1 + B00)) > 0 and so B00 < B0
β . Following
the same logic, we get debt decreasing in every period, at a rate faster than 1/β, i.e., approaching
−∞, while the allocation is {ˆ x,c,g} in every period. But for any B ≤ ˆ B we can implement the
ﬁrst-best, a contradiction with c < ˆ c, g < ˆ g.
Now we show X 0
B < 0 for all B ≥ −1. Suppose not. From the proof above, we know that
B0 = B(B) > −1 for any B ≥ −1. Fix some B ≥ −1 such that X 0
B ≥ 0. Diﬀerentiating (26)






















yyy0) = 0. Given
v0
g −α > 0, X 0
B ≥ 0 and Assumption 2, the ﬁrst and third terms are jointly negative; thus, G0
B > 0.
By Lemma 3 we also get C0
B > 0. Thus, increasing B0 above the prescribed B(B): (a) (weakly)
increases x0 since X 0
B ≥ 0; (b) increases c0 and g0 since C0
B,G0
B > 0; and (c) makes the government
budget constraint (28) slack by Lemma 4. Thus, the current government can increase welfare by
increasing B0, a contradiction with X 0
B ≥ 0 being an equilibrium.
A.3.7 Part (vii)
Suppose εx0X 0
B = 0 for some B > −1. From part (vi), X 0
B < 0; thus, εx0 = 0, which is an equation







yyy∗ − 1 + η.



















1−η < 0, the only solution with v∗
g − α > 0 features u∗
x − f∗
y > 0 and ζ∗ = 0. By part
(i), B∗ > −1.
A.4 Proof of Proposition 3
Focus on B ≥ −1, i.e., when ζ = 0. As ν → 0, vg → ψ and (25) becomes (ψ − α)εx0X 0
B = 0. From
Proposition 2, we have X 0
B < 0 (we verify this property below to ensure it holds in the limit). Thus,
since ψ > α, εx0 = 0. This is an equation in B0 and X(B0) only; thus, the solution B0 is the same





αη . Diﬀerentiating both sides with respect to B implies

(1 − η)uxx − ηfyy
fy + fyyy
−









Given Assumption 2, the term multiplying XB is strictly negative; thus, XB < 0 for all B ≥ −1.
Applying the same argument as in Proposition 2, part (vii), we have B∗ > −1; hence, we verify
X 0
B = X ∗
B < 0.
A.5 Proof of Proposition 4











x ). The right-hand side of this




x > 1 is a necessary condition for B∗ > 0.






yyy∗ . Given f∗
y + f∗
yyy∗ > 0, B∗ > 0 iﬀ u∗
x + u∗
xxx∗ < 0.
Part (iii). As η → 0, B∗ → −1, trivially.




x∗−σ). From Proposition 2,
x∗−σ > φ; thus, −1 + σ > (
1−η
η ), i.e., ησ > 1, is a suﬃcient condition for B∗ > 0.
A.6 Proof of Proposition 5
The problem with commitment has been analyzed extensively elsewhere16, so some steps are skipped
for brevity. I will consider the sequence problem of a government with commitment (i.e., the Ramsey
problem). A standard result is that the sequence of government budget constraints collapses to a
single “implementability” constraint. A simple way to derive it here, is to take (19), multiply it by βt
and sum over all periods. Then, use the transversality condition, limT→∞ βT (1+µT)(1+qTBT+1)
pT = 0,
which implies limT→∞ βT(Uc,Tfy,TxT)−1{βηxT+1(ux,T+1 −fy,T+1)+βfy,T+1xT+1(1+BT+1)} = 0.
16E.g., see ?, D´ ıaz-Gim´ enez, Giovannetti, Marim´ on and Teles (2008) and Aruoba and Chugh (2008).




βt {(Uc,t − α)ct − αgt + ηxt(ux,t − fy,t)} − ηx0(ux,0 − fy,0) − fy,0x0(1 + B0) = 0. (34)






βt {ηu(xt) − (1 − η)f(yt) + U(ct) − α(ct + gt) + v(gt)}
subject to: (34); ux,t − fy,t ≥ 0 for all t.
Assume B0 > −1, so that the non-negativity constraint does not bind in any period (easy to
verify). The ﬁrst-order conditions are
η(ux,0 − fy,0) − Λ(fy,0 + fyy,0y0)(1 + B0) = 0, for t = 0
(ux,t − fy,t) + Λ(ux,t − fy,t + uxx,txt − fyy,tyt) = 0, for all t ≥ 1
Uc,t − α + Λ(Uc,t − α + Ucc,tct) = 0, for all t ≥ 0
vg,t − α − Λα = 0, for all t ≥ 0,
where Λ is the Lagrange multiplier associated with (34). Note that ct and gt are constant for
all t ≥ 0, while xt is constant for all t ≥ 1 and may be diﬀerent in the initial period. Call the
corresponding allocation {x0,x1,c,g}. Thus, we can write (34) as (Uc−α)c−αg+βηx1(ux,1−fy,1) =
(1−β)fy,0x0(1+B0). Plug this expression into the government budget constraint (19) and we get
Bt =
fy,0x0(1+B0)
fy,1x1 − 1 for all t ≥ 1, i.e., debt is constant after the initial period as well, which is a
standard feature of this type of models. After some rearrangements, {x0,x1,c,g} solve
αη(ux,0 − fy,0) − (vg − α)(fy,0 + fyy,0y0)(1 + B0) = 0
vg(ux,1 − fy,1) + (vg − α)(uxx,1x1 − fyy,1y1) = 0
vg(Uc − α) + (vg − α)Uccc = 0
(Uc − α)c − αg + βηx1(ux,1 − fy,1) − (1 − β)fy,0x0(1 + B0) = 0.
If we set B0 = B∗, it is straightforward to verify that {x∗,x∗,c∗,g∗} solves the above system. Thus,
Bt = B∗ for all t ≥ 0.
A.7 Proof of Proposition 6
As ρ → 1 and ν → 0, we get: B∗ →
ηασ
ψ−σ(ψ−α) − 1; µ∗ →
β(ψ−σ(ψ−α)(1−η))












. Note that in steady state, inﬂation is equal to
the money growth rate. The restrictions on parameter values imply ψ −σ(ψ −α) > 0, βψ −α > 0








(ψ−σ(ψ−α))2 < 0; ∂τ∗











































, same sign as ασ+(ψ−σ(ψ−α))ln
φψ
ψ−σ(ψ−α), i.e., same


































σ, same sign as σ − 1.
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